Sunday 27 October 2019

Markowitz the micro-economist of the investor

In 1990 Markowitz was awarded the Nobel prize, so I had a read of his short acceptance speech, which quite clearly sets the scene for his work.  He describes microeconomics as populated by three types of actor - the firm, the consumer and the investor (that last one being the actor he focuses on).  He then also interestingly creates binary divisions on work in on each of these three actors.  First, the individual and then the generalised aspect of their ideal behaviour.   How ought a firm best act?  A consumer?  An investor.  After having answered these questions, the generalisation is, how would the economy look if every firm, every consumer and every investor acted in the same way.

It is worth pausing on just this point about generalisation alone.  Clearly the question of uncertainty must raise its head to our modern ear.  Can one model all firms as following he same basic template, a so-called rational template?  If we can, then we may identify an economic equilibrium state.  Likewise, with consumers, how does an economy look if everybody is consuming according to the same basic utility function.  In both of these cases, whilst uncertainty is present, and known about by economic modellers, it is given a back seat.  Markowitz accepts this, but shows how it is literally impossible to background when it comes to the actions of the rational investor, since doing so leads to a model where every investor picks the single security with the largest expected return.  This does not happen, so any model which treats risk/uncertainty poorly is insufficient.

I think it is probably widely agreed that today, models of the firm's behaviour and of consumers' behaviour is best done with uncertainty built into the model.  The old linear optimisation models accepted that variability in firms, or consumers could be averaged away.  That is, that it was a valid approach to assume minimal uncertainty and see how, under those simplifying model assumptions, equilibrium models of the economy might be produced.

But fundamentally, portfolio investing in the absence of risk makes no sense at all.  In this case, in the limit, we find the portfolio with the best expected return, and put all our money in this.  However, not many people actually do that.  So, in the sense that the micro-economic models of the investor make claims to model actual behaviour, then uncertainty must play a more prominent role.

Markowitz also hands off on 'the equilibrium model of the investor' to Sharpe and Lintner's CAPM. He is happy to see basic portfolio theory as the element which attempts to model how people actually act (hence, a normative model) and leaves positive elements to Sharpe's theory, which I think he does so with only partial success.  But  certainly I see how he's keen to do so, especially since his mean variance functions are not in themselves utility functions, and in that sense don't touch base with economic theory as well as Arrow-Pratt.

Rather, looking back on his achievement, he makes a contrast between Arrow-Pratt and his own, perhaps more lowly contribution and praises his approach as computationally simpler.  This may be true, but it isn't a theoretically powerful defence.  However, I like Markowitz, I like his lineage, Hume, Jimmy Savage and the Bayesian statistical approach.  I'm happy to go along with his approach.

I notice how Markowitz gently chides John Burr Williams for describing the value of an equity as the present value of its future dividends, instead of describing it as the present value of its expected future dividends, that is to say, Markowitz draws out that these dividends ought to be modelled as a probability distribution, with a mean and with a variance.

Markowitz also highlights early on in his career that he reckons that downside semi-variance would be a better model of risk in the win-lose sense, but he notes that he's never seen any research which shows semi-variance captures a better model than variance.  This is a rather passive backing off of his original insight into semi-variance.  Did he not consider doing any real work on this?  Is it enough for him to note that he hasn't seen any papers on this?  However, it is certainly true that there isn't a huge numerical difference in equity index returns, usually, so I could well believe this doesn't matter as much as it sounds, though it would be good to know if someone has confirmed it isn't an important enough distinction.

What Markowitz in effect did was replace expected utility maximisation with an approximation function, which is a function of portfolio mean and portfolio variance, and then he, and others later, try to reverse this back in to particular shapes of utility function.  This is where the computer science algorithm of simplex, together with the ad hoc objective function involving maximising returns and minimising variance attempt to meet top quality economic theory, as expressed in Morgenstern and Von Neumann

Markowitz then spends the rest of his lecture showing how strongly correlated mean-variance optimisation is with believable utility functions.

He wraps up, as I'm sure many good Nobel laureates do, by talking about new lines of research.  Here, he lists three: applying mean variance analysis to data other than just returns.  He refers to these as state variables.  They too could have a mean-variance analysis applied to them.  Semi-variance, as mentioned already, is another possible new line of development, and finally he mulls over the seemingly arbitrary connection between certain utility functions and his beloved mean-variance approach.    The slightly point here is that all three of these potential lines of investigation were already candidates back in 1959, yet clearly here is Markowitz in 1990 repeating them as issues still.  


Where Portfolio Selection sits

Markowitz  (1952) is in effect a connection made between a piece of new computer science (linear programming and techniques such as simplex, and generally constrained optimisation solutions which arose out of the second world war) and an application in financial theory.  He tells the admirably random story of how he was waiting to see his professor when he struck up a conversation with another guy in the room, waiting to see the same professor, the guy being a broker, who suggested to Markowitz that he should apply his computer science algorithms skill to solving finance problems.

And given this random inspiration, he later finds himself in a library reading a book by John Burr Williams and he has a moment of revelation, namely that when you consider portfolios, the expected return on the portfolio is homogeneously just the weighted average of the expected returns of the component securities and so if this was the only criterion which mattered, your portfolio would just be 100% made up of that single portfolio which had the highest expected return.  You might call this the ancestral 'absolute alpha' strategy.  In knowing this single criterion was silly, he drew upon his liberal arts background, his knowledge of the Merchant of Venice, Act 1 Scene 1, as well as his understanding of game theory, particularly the idea of an iterated game and the principle of diversification, to seek out variance as an operational definition of risk.

He now had two dimensions to optimise, maximise returns whilst simultaneously minimise variance.  And finally, when he looks at how portfolio variance is calculated, he has his second moment of inspiration, since this is not just a naive sum of constituent variances, no, the portfolio variance calculation is a different beast.  This feeling, that the behaviour of the atoms are not of the same quality as the behaviour of the mass, is perhaps also what led John Maynard Keynes to posit a macro-economics which was different in quality to the micro- or classical economics of his education.

With normalised security quantities $x_i$ the portfolio variance is $\sum_i \sum_j x_i x_j \sigma_{i,j}$.

His third great moment was in realising that this was a soluble optimisation program, soluble in the case of two or three securities geometrically, but soluble in the general case with linear programming.  Linear programming also allowed for linear constraints to be added, indeed demanded that some be the case; for example that full investment occur, $\sum_i x_i = 1$, and that you can't short, $\forall i, x_i>0$.

However, notice the tension.  We humans often tend to favour one end of the normal distribution over another whereas mathematics doesn't care.  Take the distribution of returns, we cherish, desire even, the right hand side of the returns distribution and fear the left hand side.  So maximising the return on a portfolio makes good sense to us, but variance is not left or right handed.  Minimising variance is minimising the positive semi-variance and minimising the negative semi-variance too.  This is, so to speak, sub-optimal.  We want to avoid downside variance, but we probably feel a lot more positively disposed to upside variance.  Yet the mathematics of variance is side-neutral, yet we plug straight into that maths.